[2609 Grant] Kleros Foresight - Grant Completion Markets for RootstockCollective - Milestone 1

Grants & Incentives
1

Before funding a grant, delegates assess whether a team can deliver. Kleros Foresight proposes adding a market-based estimate to that assessment: if this team is funded, will they complete their grant?

During a six-month pilot, participants will trade on grant outcomes, with completion defined by the terminal milestone payment. Delegates will receive a market reading before each funding vote, and the pilot will produce a public record of forecasts and outcomes to evaluate how useful those readings were.

Grant request: $15,000 in USDRIF, Strategic tier, across five milestones. This first request is $1,500 for Milestone 1. The money goes toward deploying the venue natively on Rootstock and running a six-month pilot. Kleros Cooperative covers the liquidity, the impermanent loss and the trading credits. The markets are non-binding and change no governance rules.

Sector: Analytics, dashboards & data infrastructure. Submission date: 21 September 2026.

Current stage: Reality.eth and the arbitrator are deployed on Rootstock mainnet. The Seer market contracts and the live interface are M2 deliverables; the Rootstock interface is currently a mockup.

Live mockup: https://rootstock2.vercel.app/

What Kleros delivers

A market that opens when a team posts its proposal and gives delegates a live estimate through the discussion window: the probability that this team, if funded, completes their grant.

Traders back their view with capital. If the DAO declines to fund, the market voids and positions are refunded. The DAO keeps every decision; the market makes completion risk visible earlier.

Markets will run on Kleros Foresight and settle via Reality.eth with Kleros as an arbitration backstop. They will trade in USDRIF on a native Rootstock deployment of Seer.

The output is decision-making data for the DAO and a public market venue on Rootstock. The pilot will test whether the market’s pre-funding estimates predict grant outcomes better than a historical baseline.

How the mechanism works

For each grant application we open a conditional market:

If {TEAM} is funded, will they successfully complete their grant?

  • Market opens: When the off-chain proposal is posted to the forum.
  • Voids and refunds: The application is withdrawn, outright rejected, or 120 days pass from the forum post with no first tranche paid. The void window closes permanently when the first tranche is paid.
  • Resolves YES: The designated terminal milestone payment is made following its post-completion review.
  • Resolves NO, after funding only: The DAO votes to cancel the grant, or 150 days elapse without a grant-tranche payment. The clock runs from the most recent grant-tranche payment and resets with each subsequent tranche.
  • Pre-vote reading: The market’s published probability is recorded before the on-chain funding vote and published as the vote opens.

These are the proposed timing rules. M1 will finalize them with the Collective against grant schedules and terminal-review timing, before markets open.

FES remains the Collective’s framework for evaluating grant impact; it is not the market’s settlement source. Settlement uses the terminal payment, a timestamped on-chain event. KYC/KYB, AMAs, milestone reviews and monthly reporting stay as they are today.

Demand and relevant experience

The user of this grant is the Collective itself. This proposal has been through two rounds of written delegate review and has been circulated to the Collective’s working group. We thank Axia for BD context and review, and SEEDGov for substantive feedback on the mechanism. Delegates are invited to confirm in this thread whether they would use a pre-funding completion signal when assessing applications.

Kleros built and currently operates Kleros Foresight, with Seer providing the prediction-market infrastructure and Kleros handling dispute resolution. The team has experience running incentivised prediction-market experiments, including the Foresight movie experiment. Kleros team members also have direct operational experience with Deep Funding, which uses Seer infrastructure.

Liquidity and funding

Kleros Cooperative provides the liquidity and separately funds trading incentives for delegates and Rootstock community members. The liquidity allocation and credit budget will be confirmed during M1 before market launch; neither is requested from the Collective.

Credits are meant as working capital, not a payment: spendable only inside the markets, never withdrawable as cash. What a participant keeps is whatever their positions are worth at resolution. Participants may also trade their own capital alongside credits.

Cross-funding disclosure: No external grant funds the infrastructure this pilot runs on: Kleros funds the Foresight interface, the resolution layer and the pilot liquidity. For overlapping scope, the same Seer stack runs on Gnosis Chain, including a parallel decision-market pilot with Shutter DAO 0x36. Kleros offers comparable decision-market pilots to other DAOs as well. Kleros has received no funding from Rootstock Labs and no prior RootstockCollective grant.

Technical architecture and security

Markets use Seer contracts on Rootstock, collateralised in USDRIF, with the Kleros Foresight interface as the front end. Each market settles through Reality.eth on Rootstock, deployed at 0x4396DB62818eFd4dbcf34A069047E66dB4a1cc66. Disputes are decided by Kleros Court on Ethereum, with rulings relayed to Rootstock by a Kleros multisig.

The market contracts are not upgradeable. The arbitrator’s owner can set the Reality.eth address, set the dispute fee, publish arbitration metadata, and relay a Court ruling. It cannot make a ruling, only carry one. Ownership transfers to a 2-of-3 Kleros multisig before the first market opens, and the transfer transaction is part of the M2 evidence. The markets are advisory and cannot execute Collective treasury payments.

Prior security incidents disclosure: No security incident has involved the Kleros team, the Seer or Foresight protocol, or the Kleros Court contracts, on Rootstock or any other chain. The Reality.eth contracts this pilot deploys are audited, with no reported compromise. Reality.eth has featured in two third-party DAO incidents and in neither was any contract compromised or did any behave other than as specified. In both, an incorrect answer went unchallenged and was executed directly against a DAO treasury. Neither case was arbitrated by Kleros, and neither DAO was covered by Kleros Cooperative monitoring. Kleros Court is configured as the arbitrator from the first market and answer events are monitored, so an incorrect answer is challenged rather than left to finalize.

Milestones

M1 funds pilot design. M2 delivers the verified contracts, live Rootstock interface and end-to-end integration required before trading begins. M2’s delivery date will be established during M1, following engineering coordination, and published before the M2 funding request.

Milestone Deliverables Timing Amount
M1 - Pilot design Technical specifications: activation, void and resolution rules; pre-vote readings; credit distribution. 2 weeks $1,500 USDRIF
M2 - Deployment Verified Rootstock contract addresses, deployed versions and commits, live interface, USDRIF markets and resolution layer wired end to end. TBC during M1 $3,750 USDRIF
M3 - Markets trading Trading credits distributed, markets operating; markets analytics and reading report. 6 months of live markets $3,000 USDRIF
M4 - Calibration and Final Report Predicted versus actual outcome against the historical baseline; cost report, participation data. 4 weeks $2,250 USDRIF
M5 - Terminal Milestone Post-completion impact review against FES metrics After M4 $4,500 USDRIF

Markets still open at the end of the pilot run to their own resolution. M4 reports on every market opened in the pilot, distinguishing settled outcomes from pending outcomes.

FES Metrics and reporting

Metric Target/evidence
Market coverage A market for every eligible grant application posted during the pilot window.
Readings before funding votes A published reading for 100% of covered applications that reach an on-chain funding vote.
Participation At least 15 delegate addresses issued credits and 10 distinct addresses trading over the six-month pilot.
Calibration Every settled funded-grant market scored against its pre-vote forecast and a documented historical baseline.
Lasting infrastructure Seer, Reality.eth and the arbitrator deployed, verified and public on Rootstock at pilot end.

Kleros will provide monthly activity reports on Discourse, milestone updates, and public links to markets and contracts. The final retrospective will detail trading volumes, active traders, liquidity, realized costs and participation. The calibration report is a research deliverable; outperformance against the baseline is not a condition promised by this proposal.

The infrastructure will remain available after the pilot. If targets are missed, Kleros keeps the venue operational past grant close and reports the shortfall and the fix. The proposal includes the program’s AMAs and 12-month post-grant communication obligations.

Team and resources

Juan Ramiro Garza (JuanRah) - Oracle Lead, Kleros. Leads mechanism design, resolution rules and coordination with the Collective. Previously Domain Allocator in the Education, Community Growth, and Events vertical in the Arbitrum DAO Grant Program. | GitHub | LinkedIn

Clément Lesaege - Co-founder and CTO, Kleros. Built Seer and owns the architecture of the market and resolution stack.

Alexandre (0xAlex) - Integration Lead, Kleros. Runs Kleros’s integrations and partnerships with DAOs/institutions.

Additional Links

Interface mockup | Kleros Foresight | Reality.eth repo | Reality.eth on Rootstock | Rootstock arbitrator | Kleros | Kleros (@Kleros_io) / X | Video pitch will be posted in this thread before the Initial AMA

4 Likes
Rootstock - Governance at a Glance 26-10-06
2

Very interesting proposal. In some ways it would also allow teams to hedge grants applications :slight_smile:
But all in all I always loved decision markets for grants, and this is an implementation with human in the loop.

Thanks for proposing.

1 Like
3

Thanks for proposing this, @JuanRah This reminds me of futarchy, although the prediction market here focuses on whether a project will complete its grant, providing an additional signal for delegates when evaluating grant proposals.

I’m curious whether you see the platform developing beyond this initial use case. For example, could it eventually support more detailed forecasting of grant-related outcomes, such as milestone delivery, adoption, or measurable ecosystem impact? Or is the intention to focus specifically on grant completion as the primary use case?

Do you see an opportunity to develop the platform into a prediction-market venue with wider applications beyond grant evaluation? If people could participate in forecasting different outcomes related to Rootstock’s ecosystem, this could open up new ways for the community to engage with governance and bring more attention to governance discussions.

I’d love to hear how you envision the platform evolving beyond the initial six-month pilot.

4

My vote is IN FAVOR of Milestone 1 ($1,500 USDRIF) to move forward with the pilot design. My support for the upcoming stages will depend on how the team addresses the following key aspects:

1. Complexity for new users: If the goal is to get more members involved in the DAO, adding trading mechanics might overwhelm non-technical voters. How will you simplify the interface (UX) and what educational resources will you provide to prevent this from becoming a barrier to entry?

2. Manipulation risk: What mechanisms are planned to prevent a proposing team from massively buying the “YES” option with their own capital to artificially inflate their probability and bias the delegates?

3. Qualitative context behind positions: If the goal is to generate useful information for voters, is there a planned space where traders can leave arguments or reasons for their positions? A numerical probability is valuable, but knowing the underlying analysis enriches the debate and helps delegates in their own research.

5

I like the idea of adding a market-based signal to the grant evaluation process, especially because it creates a public record that can later be compared with actual outcomes.

One thing I’d be interested in understanding better is how you plan to account for markets with low participation or liquidity. For example, if only a few participants trade a market, would its probability still be presented to delegates in the same way as a market with much higher participation?

It could also be interesting to include some indication of market confidence or participation alongside the probability, so delegates have some context when interpreting the signal.

Overall, I think this could be a useful experiment, particularly because the pilot would generate actual data to evaluate whether the signal adds something to the existing grant evaluation process.

6

Hi everyone!

Wanted to signal that we support this proposal. We believe this pilot program for futarchy and decision markets represents an interesting governance experiment that could benefit the Rootstock Collective in several ways.

First, it provides an opportunity to experiment with new approaches to decision-making, or, as in this case, with new tools designed to support the decision-making process. Second, from a visibility perspective, this experiment could position Rootstock Colkective at the forefront of experimentation with innovative governance tools, creating an opportunity to generate visibility, attract attention, and strengthen the DAO’s positioning within the broader governance ecosystem.

Finally, SEEDGov has previously promoted similar experiments with Kleros in other governance ecosystems, such as Velora, where unfortunately the protocol and DAO faced financial difficulties that forced the suspension of a program that was already underway and beginning to show promising results. We therefore see this initiative as a continuation of, and consistent with, the type of experimentation we have supported and pursued in the recent past, which is another reason why we are happy to support this proposal.

Lastly, in the interest of transparency, we want to disclose to the Collective that we have been in communication with Kleros since a very early stage of this proposal and provided feedback on the initial drafts. Those drafts were substantially different from the proposal currently under consideration, but we believe it is important to disclose our prior involvement nonetheless.

Thanks!

7

Thanks for sharing this proposal. I like the idea of adding a market-based signal to grant evaluation, especially because it gives delegates another data point before funding decisions without changing the governance process itself.

One thing I think will be important is how the probability is presented to users. A number like “72% chance of completion” can look more certain than it really is, especially if only a small number of traders are active or if liquidity is thin.

I would suggest showing the probability together with simple context such as the number of active traders, total liquidity, trading volume, and how concentrated the positions are. It would also help to clearly label the market as an advisory signal, not a recommendation or governance decision.

For the six-month pilot, I would also like to see whether the signal changes meaningfully as new information appears during the forum discussion. That could show whether the market is actually processing new information, rather than just reflecting the first impression of a proposal.

From a community perspective, a short guide explaining how to read the market and what its limitations are would also make participation easier for non-expert users.

Overall, I think the pilot could produce useful governance data, but transparency around market quality and interpretation will be important.

8

Thanks everyone for reading the proposal and for your questions, answering each of you below.

We first considered a market for every milestone. When we tested that design against the Collective’s grant history, some of those markets would have resolved incorrectly. Milestones are often resubmitted before they pass, and some are voted down for procedural reasons, rather than because the team failed to deliver.

We also considered adoption and ecosystem impact but a market needs a published number to settle against. We know the Collective is working on FES as a numeric measure of grant impact so this exercise could evolve into that after the pilot.

Ultimately, we chose grant completion because it settles on an unambiguous event: the terminal milestone payment, which anyone can check on-chain.

Yes, the infrastructure is general. This pilot runs on Seer, a prediction market protocol that can host a market on any question. And Kleros Foresight is the interface built on Seer for decision markets, where the question is which option to fund or choose. It has already been used to pick films from a shortlist and side events for Devcon.

Part of this is already on Rootstock. Reality.eth is live on Rootstock mainnet, and any Rootstock application can use it as an oracle today, whether or not this proposal passes. For the pilot, we are keeping to one question so the final report can give a clean answer on whether the signal is useful.

Thanks for your support @Mattsanto. To answer your questions (and @IBUKI’s):
Delegates do not need to trade to use the output. The market reading is published in each application’s forum thread when the funding vote opens. For those who do want to trade, each market is a single question with two sides: will this team complete their grant, yes or no. We will distribute trading credits to delegates and community members, so anyone can try it without putting in their own money.

Every Foresight session also comes with its own guides, a beginner guide written for that specific session, and an advanced guide on what happens after your first prediction. See the Devcon session guide and the advanced guide. The Rootstock markets will get a similar one.

A team that buys its own YES to inflate the reading pays for it. Every share it buys above what the outcome is really worth is a share someone else can sell to it, or bet against, at a profit. If the team does not deliver, its YES position goes to zero when the market resolves NO. If the team does deliver, buying YES was not manipulation but an accurate forecast, which is exactly what the market is for.

The market is advisory, it gives delegates one more input and changes no vote. A delegate who sees a high probability on a proposal that looks weak should ask why, not defer to the number.

We designed the pilot to fit into the Collective’s existing workflow and to change as little as possible in a grant’s path from application to completion. So the place for traders’ reasoning is each application’s forum thread.

I agree on these points. Defining how the pre-vote reading is presented is part of the M1 pilot design. We will consider showing participation and liquidity indicators alongside the probability. Every reading we post will be labelled as an advisory signal, not a recommendation and not a governance decision. Trades are public on-chain, so the participation behind any reading can be checked by anyone, and the final report will cover trading volume, active traders, liquidity and participation for every market.

@IBUKI, on whether the signal reacts to new information, this is the idea. A market opens when the application is posted, so it trades through the whole forum discussion, and its price history is public. The pilot’s own data will show whether it moves.

Thank you @Raphael_Anode and @SEEDGov for your support of this proposal, and the feedback on the early drafts.

2 Likes
9

I think this could be a useful addition to the governance process, especially as an extra signal for delegates when reviewing a grant.

For me, the important point is that the prediction market remains an additional source of information and does not affect the delegates’ voting power or decision-making. The final decision should still depend on the delegates and their own evaluation of each proposal, while the market can simply provide another perspective.

I also think it will be interesting to see how useful these signals are during the pilot, especially with the planned participation levels. The results could help show whether this type of market provides useful information for future grant evaluations.

Overall, I like the idea as long as it stays advisory and does not replace the governance process. I would also find the activity and final results useful to review after the pilot, so the Collective can see whether the markets actually provided value before considering any further use of this approach.

10

Thank you so much, @JuanRah for this fairly solid proposal, and for addressing other delegates earlier questions on manipulation risk and trade reasoning. We are in general support of moving forward with this pilot - it’s a clean, non-binding experiment that could give delegates a valuable signal during grant diligence.

However, to ensure the output remains a reliable decision-making tool during the M1 design phase, we would like to see some clarify or commitments to the following points, before we can fully support this proposal:

  • Liquidity Depth: What is the baseline liquidity commitment per market from Kleros Cooperative, and how will you prevent extreme slippage for markets where trading credits are concentrated?

  • Hard Thresholds for Low-Participation Flags: Following up on the discussion around thin liquidity, can we make it an explicit M1 deliverable that any pre-vote reading must display a warning flag (or be withheld) if a market fails to meet a minimum participation threshold (e.g., fewer than 5 distinct traders)? A raw percentage without a confidence interval risks anchoring delegates incorrectly.

  • The 150-Day Timeout Edge Case: Could you clarify how the 150-day “NO” resolution window behaves if a project is actively communicating delays but has not received a formal DAO cancellation vote or milestone payment?

If these parameters are incorporated into M1, we would be favor of supporting this pilot. Tks!

11

Thanks for putting this together @JuanRah.

I support M1 as a small, practical design phase. The pilot is not meant to replace delegate judgment; it gives delegates one more public signal to consider when reviewing grant applications.

Using the terminal milestone payment as the resolution point gives the pilot a clear outcome to test against. If it moves forward, the Collective will be able to assess whether market readings provided useful additional context during grant review.

12

La propuesta me parece un experimento interesante para incorporar una nueva capa de información al proceso de evaluación de grants, especialmente porque no pretende sustituir el criterio de los delegados ni modificar el proceso de gobernanza. En esencia, busca convertir una parte de la incertidumbre sobre la capacidad de ejecución de un equipo en una señal de mercado que pueda observarse y posteriormente contrastarse con el resultado real. Además, el hecho de que el resultado se resuelva mediante un evento on-chain claramente verificable, como el pago del terminal milestone, hace que el experimento tenga una base objetiva para medir su desempeño.

Uno de los aspectos que más valoro es precisamente que el piloto no necesita asumir de antemano que el mecanismo funciona. Los seis meses de datos pueden permitir comparar las predicciones del mercado con un baseline histórico y determinar si realmente existe valor informativo adicional para los delegados.

Mi principal punto de atención estaría en distinguir entre participación en el mercado y calidad de la señal. Tener suficientes traders es necesario, pero no necesariamente significa que el mercado esté agregando información relevante. Sería interesante que el reporte final pudiera analizar no solo volumen, liquidez y número de participantes, sino también si las probabilidades evolucionan de manera consistente cuando aparecen nuevas evidencias durante la discusión de una propuesta.

También considero importante que el piloto permita identificar cuándo una señal debe interpretarse con cautela. Una probabilidad determinada por pocos participantes o con poca liquidez puede tener un significado muy diferente de otra con mayor participación y profundidad de mercado.

Por último, creo que uno de los resultados más interesantes sería comprobar si la señal de Foresight aporta información incremental respecto del análisis tradicional de los delegados. Si después de seis meses podemos observar no solo si el mercado acertó, sino también cuándo aportó una perspectiva que no era evidente inicialmente, el experimento tendría un valor mucho mayor para futuras decisiones de gobernanza.

En ese sentido, apoyo que se avance con M1 como una fase de diseño y validación. Me parece una aproximación prudente primero construir la infraestructura y definir correctamente las reglas de medición, y después utilizar datos reales para evaluar si este mecanismo merece convertirse en una herramienta permanente dentro del proceso de grants.

13

As a lawyer, I find this proposal particularly interesting.

Kleros is a project I have been following for quite some time, and I have always found it fascinating how it seeks to bring concepts traditionally associated with law, dispute resolution, and arbitration into the world of decentralized protocols.

In this case, I find the application of Kleros Foresight within Rootstock Collective particularly interesting. Using prediction markets to provide an additional signal about the likelihood of a team successfully completing its grant could bring a different perspective to the traditional evaluation of proposals.

I also think it is important that this signal remains advisory and does not replace the delegates’ decision-making or change the governance rules.

From my perspective, one of the most interesting aspects will be observing during the pilot whether these predictions actually provide useful information, and whether there is a correlation between market expectations before funding and the final outcomes of the grants.

I would especially like to understand how these results will be measured at the end of the pilot and what methodology will be used to determine whether the prediction market is actually improving the information available to delegates.

Overall, I think this is a very interesting proposal and a valuable experiment with new governance tools within Rootstock Collective.

14

Hi! I read the Kleros Foresight proposal and this week’s comments. The idea makes sense: before funding a grant, they add a market that estimates “if we fund them, will they finish?”. It starts soft with M1 at 1,500 USDRIF (15,000 total), a six-month pilot, and Kleros covers the market capital and the credits. The markets are non-binding — the DAO still decides.

I like that completion is tied to the final grant payment, and that if the DAO does not fund, the market voids and refunds. Earlier comments said it well: this is an extra signal, it does not replace delegate judgment. The team already answered a lot: the reading shows up in the grant thread, you do not need to trade to use it, and the pilot starts with one question so we can measure if it helps.

A couple of suggestions. First, as other users asked: next to the % show when few people traded, so nobody confuses a thin number with a strong signal. Second, one concrete example with a recent finished grant: “if this had been live, what would it have shown?”. Third, a short plain-language guide on each thread (what that % means for someone who does not trade).

If the pilot helps back more teams that finish, this can be a useful tool for the DAO.

15

One point we would like to highlight as particularly relevant for Rootstock in this proposal as a whole is that USDRIF will be used as the liquidity pool and trading asset. This was actually one of the first suggestions we made when we were asked to provide feedback on the early drafts of the proposal, and we thank the Kleros team for its inclusion.

This feature is particularly meaningful because it is aligned with the current Grant Guidelines, especially with the strategic objective of promoting the adoption and circulation of USDRIF. If this project achieves the success we all expect, a positive secondary effect for the ecosystem would be increased use, circulation, and distribution of USDRIF.

1 Like
16

Thanks for the continued discussion and clarifications from the Kleros team.

Good to see the use of USDRIF highlighted, particularly its alignment with the Collective’s grant guidelines.

From our earlier review, one point we’d still like to see clearly addressed during M1 is how market resolution will handle delayed or extended grants, alongside safeguards against manipulation in low-liquidity markets.

Overall, we’re supportive of moving forward and look forward to seeing these details reflected in the pilot design.

17

Thanks everyone for the comments, and for the support. Answering below.

As stated in the proposal, the liquidity allocation and the credit budget will be confirmed during the first milestone, before any market opens, and will not come from the Collective. We will publish the amounts in this thread as part of the M1 specification. To prevent extreme slippage, we will set the liquidity per market so that no single trader, and no rush of credits into one market, can move the reading far on its own.

Yes, we will make it an M1 deliverable. Every pre-vote reading we post will show how many distinct addresses traded the market, and a reading below the minimum will carry a low-participation warning. We are also looking at showing the same count directly in the interface.

The clock starts with the most recent tranche payment and resets with every new one, so a team that is delivering slowly but still getting tranches approved will never run into this problem. If a team has no tranche paid for 150 days, the market resolves NO.

We chose the number from the Collective’s own history. Across the tranches that were actually paid, the longest gap we identified between two payments was 119 days. 150 days sits above every gap between paid tranches in that record.

It is important to consider that even if a market is resolved to NO, it does not cancel the grant, and it does not affect the team’s funding. The grant continues under the Collective’s normal process. The market only records that no payment moved within the window, and the team’s delay updates in the forum are exactly the information traders should price before that point.

On manipulation in thin markets: the low-participation warning above flags any reading moved by only a few addresses. Every trade is public on-chain, a team buying its own YES above what the outcome is worth is offering an easy profit to anyone who disagrees.

The M4 report compares the market’s reading before the funding vote with what actually happened, and does the same for a historical baseline: the share of the Collective’s past funded grants that reached completion. If the market’s readings sit closer to the outcomes than the baseline does, the market added information. If they do not, the report will say so.

Given that grants take months to complete, the number of markets that settle within the pilot will be small, and the report will state that alongside the result.

De acuerdo. El historial de precios de cada mercado es pĂşblico desde que se publica la solicitud, asĂ­ que el reporte final puede contrastar los movimientos del precio con lo que se discutiĂł en el hilo de cada solicitud.

We cannot show what the price would have been, since that depends on what traders would have bought and sold, and inventing a number would defeat the purpose. What we can show is how a finished grant would have run through the market: it opens when the application is posted on the forum, keeps trading through the vote, stays open through each tranche, and resolves YES when the terminal payment is made.

Thank you @Kath , @Axia and @SEEDGov for the support. @Kath, agreed: the market stays advisory, and the final report is meant precisely for the review you describe before any further use.

18

Thanks for the proposal, @JuanRah. We support M1 as a low-cost design phase, and the answers so far cover the market-quality questions well.

Our main question is what the full $15,000 buys Rootstock at this scale. Strategic-tier grants carry a minimum FES target of 2.0x within 12 months, roughly $30,000 of ecosystem value here. With nine Recognized Delegates and only a handful of grant applications each quarter, the pilot will run a small number of markets, and we don’t see how a participation target of at least 15 delegate addresses issued credits and 10 distinct addresses trading over six months gets near that figure. How does your proposed framework relate to that benchmark, and what does the grant buy above the $10,000 Scaling-tier ceiling? You told @DAOstar_gov the liquidity amounts will come with the M1 spec. It would help if the spec also said how much of that liquidity stays on Rootstock after the pilot.

1 Like