A note on how this cycleās compensation review played out, and what weāre proposing for the next one.
Over the past few weeks we noticed activity patterns from two delegate teams that didnāt quite match the spirit of the program. Before considering any harder action, we worked through several technical fixes within the existing framework:
Adjusted weights on metrics that were easy to optimize for
Added caps on high-volume, low-substance activities
Did manual review passes to assess engagement quality
Each round helped at the margins, but the underlying gap stayed open. The framework was rewarding patterns we didnāt design it to reward, and incremental tuning wasnāt closing things fast enough. After working through the options, we concluded that for this cycle the appropriate step was to disqualify the two teams whose activity drove the issue.
In the end the best route with the cleanest signal was simply disqualifying the gamed metrics and the teams from compensation this month.
This month marks a turning point for the Rootstock Collective delegate programme.
After extensive work with our governance facilitator Anode, we are moving away from a competitive tiered structure toward a collaborative, threshold-based model ā one where delegates are rewarded for contributing to the ecosystemās success, not for outscoring each other.
Compensation will be processed via a dApp proposal as per usual.
Two delegates did not qualify this month due to not meeting the minimum delegation threshold. Eligibility criteria are listed below.
What changed and why
The previous structure paid 6 delegates across Gold and Silver tiers based on a competitive score. The problem: competition between delegates created the wrong incentives - optimising for metrics rather than governance quality.
The new model is collaborative. Every delegate who clears the eligibility threshold gets paid. The total pool (3,750 USDRIF/month) is distributed among all qualifying delegates, with a soft taper - meaning the difference between the top and bottom slot is no more than 30%. No one is left out for finishing 7th.
Eligibility criteria
To qualify each month, a delegate must meet all of the following:
Minimum 50,000 stRIF delegation
90% or more of proposals voted
90% or more of votes with written rationale
Minimum 3 hours read time on the forum
Minimum 5 likes received
Scoring is conducted monthly by Anode. Results are published here each month.
Offboarding
Delegates may be removed from the programme for:
Confirmed gaming of metrics
Sustained inactivity
Peer vote by the delegate group
The proposal on-chain will be live today. Onwards!
We would like to ask for a clarification on the eligibility criteria. The conclusion from the discussion in the New Delegate Compensation scheme thread appears to differ from what was published in this update, which means the results would look different depending on which criteria are actually being applied.
Looking at the May results, it seems the compensation was still calculated based on the discussion thread conclusion rather than the criteria listed here. For example, if the 5 likes minimum from this update were applied, some delegates who qualified in May would not have. Thatās where our confusion comes from.
We just want to make sure we all have a shared understanding of which criteria are in effect going forward, especially since the delegate community spent time discussing and voting on these parameters together. @tamlerner@Raphael_Anode
Hey Team, last I remember during the delegate call as well, it was discussed that likes will be given 0 weightage and the same was followed for May, but in the latest post it seems like a minimum of 5 likes a delegate has to receive? @Raphael_Anode please do weigh in here. Thanks.
Worth commenting before we start reading the next few months of data:
We are layering more than one change at once. The compensation scheme is new, but also the budget is being halved, and the broader crypto market sentiment has cooled off noticeably, which on its own tends to naturally slow builder and delegate activity. If participation softens over the coming months, we should be careful not to read that as a failure of the tapering design when the budget reduction and market conditions are likely weighting a lot as well.
Lets give this model a fair window to prove itself before anyone draws conclusions about its mechanics.
If Clarity Act passes in US Senate, we should see a heavy fog of uncertainty get lifted and crypto market sentiment pickup. If this legislation fails in the next ~1 month, markets may remain heavy till Q4.
We have this in the current set, but since likes arenāt counted towards compensation at all, it makes more sense to drop this requirement. itās trivially easy to game anyway.
Now that we are a few cycles into this new system, I wanted to share one concern. I think there needs to be a way to measure authentic participation, because right now the system is rewarding participation for participationās sake. That can unintentionally disadvantage delegates who are engaging more genuinely with builders and doing the harder work of adding substance to forum discussions.
We have talked extensively before about the Collective rewarding delegates for authentic and genuine contributions. If that is an overarching value, then there needs to be some level of discretion in identifying when certain metrics may be getting gamed. Someone can always come up with a justification for their behavior after the fact, but if the system is purely metric-driven, it may miss the difference between genuine contribution and activity designed mainly to score points.
To be clear, this is not about the financial amount. The numbers involved are not large enough for that to be the core issue. The bigger concern is the integrity of the system and whether delegates and contributors can trust that it is working as intended. If the Collective wants participation rewards to carry credibility, the process needs to be able to distinguish between activity and genuine contribution.
As it relates to these latest results, there are patterns that stand out which could be flagged in future months.
I donāt want to take this thread too far down that rabbit hole right now, but Iād be happy to have that discussion separately and walk through the patterns Iām seeing and how they could be easily built-in to the compensation system design.
Thanks for bringing part of the Telegram communication to the Forum.
The new system has been around for two months now, so itās still very early to judge it.
We discussed on the chat that moving to a more equitable solution would probably be a net positive, and something I am currently exploring.
Youāre pushing for additional revenue opportunities for delegates, which is understandable and also make a good case for some potential avenues. We have so far discussed events and potential scouting, but no clear net positive route has emerged yet.
Wrt the compensation scheme: We designed this with explicit understanding of the space and the issues that delegates are here to solve now. Which are two things only:
Making sure grantees qualify before payouts
Voting to ensure this is reflected on chain and in real payouts.
My main callout here is to ensure that no programs pass just so that additional revenue opportunties for delegates get created.
To this end, the delegate compensation system is deliberately simple and minimal. This isnāt an oversight. We arrived there by watching tens of programs fail or underdeliver.
Iād appreciate if you took a moment to think through the second order effects of potential changes throughly. For now weāre going to push for even more simplicity. Itās just the right thing to do in this moment, given the resources we have.
I do think itās a good thing that Axia brings this up. Even though the compensation size got reduced, our job as delegates is to review and oversee, if we feel like something about the program could be improved or changed, itās definitely worth speaking up.
And @Axia main point isnāt the money, itās whether weāre actually measuring genuine contribution. Thereās a real difference between āparticipating to meet the baselineā and āactual contribution.ā Right now the program only uses read time as the main metric, and the rest is just a baseline to sort out which delegates qualify for the reward.
Given the current size of the program, adding more metrics to evaluate actual contribution is more overhead than itās worth.
So what Iād personally suggest is a āflat model.ā everyone who qualifies and meets the threshold is eligible for the reward, so we donāt have to argue over a ~$100 difference. But eventually, as the program evolves (bigger cap, etc.), itāll definitely need a way to evaluate the difference between āactual contributionā and just āparticipating.ā
As we have been arguing for quite some time, we share Axiaās approach. A flat system would result in there being no difference between meeting the minimum requirements and dedicating more time and effort to make a greater impact or analyzing and reviewing grants more thoroughly. That system, combined with the current low compensation levels, naturally creates an incentive to meet the minimum requirements, since any extra effort or contribution or greater dedication to evaluating grants will not be recognized. Weāre talking about grants and Treasury allocations, so we donāt think itās a good idea to incentivize minimal and beselines effort.
On the other hand, the current delegate program also does not incentivize delegates to actively contribute to ecosystem growth by attracting new builders or introducing strategic partners. Those activities require a meaningful investment of time and effort, and without appropriate additional compensation, it is only natural that few, if any, delegates will dedicate resources to them.
For that reasons, we believe @Axiaās suggestion is both valuable and worth exploring further, as it has the potential to better align incentives with the type of contributions that can generate tangible value for the Rootstock ecosystem.
