We voted FOR this proposal.
We agree with @Manu on the core diagnosis: the current 100% ceiling creates the wrong competitive surface. Builders should compete on product quality, traction, and ecosystem value, not on how much upside they are willing to give away to attract backing. Where we differ is on sequencing. A lower fixed cap may be worth debating later, but as an initial governance setting, 90% is a reasonable place to start.
This is similar in spirit to Celestia’s move to raise the minimum validator commission. When a protocol leaves pricing fully unconstrained, competition can compress economics to the point that it undermines the very participants the system depends on. Here, the risk is a race to zero, or close to it, where builders increasingly compete on reward giveaways rather than value creation. A hard upper bound does not eliminate competition, but it does remove the most destructive form of it.
We also think @DAOstar_gov raises a fair process point on baseline data. It would be useful to publish current allocation distributions and revisit this parameter after a few cycles with actual usage data. But we do not think the absence of perfect baseline data is a reason to preserve an obviously bad boundary condition, especially since this proposal introduces no new contract risk and simply activates an already-implemented protocol parameter.